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ABSTRACT 
With a predilection for market solutions, neoliberalism upholds that the individual is generally 
the best judge of his or her interests. Yet markets are never universally applied as a 
mechanism of allocation and there are reasons, in principle, why capitalism will always have 
‘missing markets’. Concentrating on the application and appropriateness of neoliberal theory 
to the workplace, this essay argues that firms are not markets, despite some tendencies in 
modern theory to conflate the two. The employment contract is a key characteristic of modern 
firms, but neoliberal theory is often silent on the distinction between an employment contract 
and a contract for services, and largely ignores the asymmetrical rights of authority within 
contracts of employment. Furthermore, the social nature of knowledge represents a challenge 
to neoliberal theory and policy, because it sometimes makes it more difficult to define 
individual property rights. Accordingly, with the growth of the knowledge economy, 
neoliberalism to some extent is an anachronism. 
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Knowledge at Work: Some Neoliberal Anachronisms 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
1. Introduction 
Neoliberalism upholds that the individual is generally the best judge of his or her interests, 
and that economic ends are generally best pursued through a market system involving private 
ownership and contractual exchange. It revives aspects of the classical liberalism of Adam 
Smith and others of two centuries ago. Neoliberalism is far from being a homogeneous 
doctrine and it has many variants, but it is generally defined in terms of the aforementioned 
propositions.1 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the two most important proponents of this 
market individualist vision were Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. These authors argued 
that a market system based on individual property rights and contracting provided the best 
guarantee of individual liberty. Such a system, as Hayek (1948, p. 18) put it, requires clear 
‘rules which, above all, enable man to distinguish between mine and thine.’ These rights and 
rules provide the basis for a mutually advantageous system of contract, where as Friedman 
(1962, p. 13) argued, both parties to a transaction ‘benefit from it, provided the transaction is 
bilaterally voluntary and informed.’ Under such conditions, markets are alleged to provide the 
best available means of maximizing both individual liberty and economic welfare.2 
Neoliberals differ among themselves on several theoretical issues, including on the validity 
or scope of an argument for government intervention based on the supposed existence of 
public goods, social costs or externalities. While some neoliberals accept a public-goods 
argument for some limited government activity, such as national defence, there has been a 
strong counter-trend to minimise the role of such arguments, even to the point of denial of the 
validity of some of these concepts (Coase, 1960, 1974; Dahlman, 1979). 
I shall mention only in passing that a thoroughgoing market individualism would be 
incompatible with prominent conservative, authoritarian and anti-libertarian values such as 
the prohibition of drugs, restrictions on the trading of sex, capital punishment, a preference for 
the incarceration rather than rehabilitation of criminals, and patriarchal family values. In 
practice, individual rights are diminished in the case of children, criminals, and the insane. 
                                                 
1 This paper was first presented at a plenary session of the Association for Social Economics in Philadelphia on 6 
January 2005. It makes use of some material from Hodgson (1999). The author is very grateful to the audience 
and two anonymous referees for comments. 
2 However, in some important respects these authors differed, in analytic and policy terms. For example, 
Friedman alone proposed redistributive measures such as a negative income tax, and Hayek alone advocated the 
‘denationalization of money’. Of the two, Hayek did more to develop his philosophical and legal principles, 
many of which were refined during his debates against proponents of socialism or collective planning in the 
1930s and 1940s. 
 - 2 - 
Furthermore, militarism and armed invasion can only be justified within such a philosophy by 
treating it as an exceptional and peculiar case, where the authoritarian means of war is 
somehow warranted by then end of establishing or restoring a market individualist regime, 
despite the fact that the population will resist or be deprived of the means of expressing their 
individual views on the matter, and even though military force is a lethal, coercive, 
authoritarian, and state-run enterprise. Notwithstanding these contradictions, the political 
triumph of market individualism in several countries since the 1970s, including in Britain and 
the United States, has entailed a coalition with prominent conservative and authoritarian 
values. But the focus here is on the rationale of modern neoliberalism, not its implementation 
in practice. 
I shall also decline to elaborate the well-established but insufficiently acknowledged fact 
that the classical liberalism of earlier thinkers, including Smith and John Stuart Mill, was 
much more qualified in its individualism and advocacy of markets than many neoliberal 
propagandists acknowledge. Smith, for example, proposed a significant regulatory role for the 
state (Pack, 1991), whereas Mill advocated worker cooperatives and argued that individual 
satisfaction was not the universal metric of human welfare. 
Although I wish to deal mainly with matters of analysis rather than policy, I first make 
some aspects of my political standpoint clear. Contrary to much traditional socialist thought, I 
think it neither possible nor desirable to marginalize markets within a modern complex 
economy. No feasible, developed and complex economic system has been proposed in which 
markets play less than a major role. On the other hand, markets differ hugely in their internal 
mechanisms and ramifications. In different cultural settings – compare the United States with 
Japan – market negotiations and mechanisms differ substantially. The outcomes of markets 
depend very much on the cultural and institutional contexts in which they operate, so we 
should avoid giving ‘the market’ universally either an unqualified positive or an unqualified 
negative moral sign. Nevertheless, markets are essential in wide sectors of industry and 
finance, particularly to accommodate and deal with innovation and change. No viable and 
dynamic alternative has ever been proposed. 
On the other hand, there remain many important areas of economic activity, including 
within the family unit, where markets are unviable or undesirable. While some markets are 
essential in a modern complex society, no system makes them a universal form of allocation. 
As yet, no developed country has legally tolerated child prostitution or the selling of votes, for 
example. Absolute individual liberty and freedom of trade must admit the possibility of 
prostitution, of the selling of babies, and even of voluntary enslavement. Assaulting our 
‘individual liberty’ and ‘freedom of contract’, the central legislatures of most countries 
typically place bounds or prohibitions upon such activities. 
Indeed, there are logical limits to the extent of markets in a capitalist society, because in 
such a system there can be no futures markets for labour or skills. The existence of such 
markets would tie the worker to an employer in a future period. Such bonding or indenture is 
generally made illegal because if extended it would turn into a form of voluntary slavery. The 
absence of futures markets for labour is an important safeguard of the freedom of the 
employee. 
However, the result of this ‘missing market’ is that the system may under-invest in human 
learning and education. As Alfred Marshall (1949, p. 470) wrote in his Principles (first 
published in 1890): ‘we meet the difficulty that whoever may incur the expense of investing 
capital in developing the abilities of the workman, these abilities will be the property of the 
workman himself: and thus the virtue of those who have aided him must remain for the 
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greater part its own reward.’ If skills are to be adequate, then their development under 
capitalism must unrealistically depend, as Marshall put it, ‘in great measure on the 
unselfishness of the employer.’ If markets are a cure for this problem, as the market 
individualist might suggest, then these futures markets for labour can only be established at 
the cost of human liberty. As far as I am aware, the neoliberal literature is silent on this 
dilemma. 
The argument in this paper centres on two important features of modern economies – 
namely firms and employment contracts – and shows how these defining structures of 
capitalism sit uneasily with neoliberal principles of individual property and free trade. 
Unknowledge and uncertainty are essential to explain the existence of these structures.3 At the 
same time, unknowledge and uncertainty undermine the neoliberal conditions of free and fair 
contract. Neoliberals are forced either to denounce firms and employment contracts or to 
dilute the principles of individual property and free trade that are central to their philosophy. 
If they choose the former rather than the latter option then they are forced into the position of 
dismantling modern corporate structures and replacing it by a system of self-employed 
producers, without corporate firms. Arguably, such a highly fragmented system would be 
highly unsuited for the complex technological and productive realities of today. 
Section two below is devoted to the firm, and upholds that it is not itself penetrated by 
market relations, although its products are often sold on markets. This absence of market 
relations within the core institution of capitalist enterprise is the first neoliberal anachronism. 
The third section emphasises the distinction between an employment contract and a contract 
for services. The existence of the employment contract depends on the existence of 
unknowledge and uncertainty concerning the process of work, which again challenges the 
informational preconditions that neoliberalism attributes to a free and fair contract. The fourth 
section discusses the social nature of knowledge and argues that it is difficult to decompose 
knowledge into discrete units that are possessed by individuals. This creates further problems 
for the accommodation of the employment contract within the neoliberal scheme. The fifth 
section concludes this essay. 
2. The Firm is Not a Market 
The corporation is a zone within which markets – in any adequate sense of that term – are 
absent: allocation and coordination are carried out by administrative rather than by market 
transactions (Simon, 1991). Accordingly, given the size and weight of the corporation in 
modern capitalism, the survival and pre-eminence of neoliberalism is somewhat surprising. 
But many contemporary economists do not accept that the corporation is necessarily a 
market-free zone. They claim to identify ‘internal markets’ within firms. However, they make 
its essence and boundaries of the firm so vague that the identification of a frontier between the 
firm and the market is made impossible. In much of the literature there is a lack of a 
minimally adequate definition through which the firm itself can be identified. Instead we have 
the obfuscatory language of ‘firm-market hybrids’, ‘hybrid forms’, and ‘quasi-firms’ 
(Hodgson, 2002).  
                                                 
3 Unknowledge refers to absent knowledge of key attributes, techniques, events or circumstances. Uncertainty is 
distinguished from risk in the manner of Knight (1921), where uncertainty refers to outcomes for which no 
probability can be calculated. 
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Much of this confusion is removed once we realize that the firm is a historically specific 
entity that has arisen in a historically specific legal framework, and the firm cannot be 
adequately understood without accommodating its legal aspects. The law regards the firm as a 
‘legal person’ meaning that the organization as a whole is taken as a singular possessive actor 
for the purposes of the law, with the capacity to make contracts, such as hiring workers, 
buying inputs, and selling goods and services. Its legal singularity means that it cannot 
simultaneously divide its organization into multiple legal units, capable of making legally 
binding contracts between themselves and within the boundaries of the firm. 
An objection to this logic would be that prices, exchanges and contracts do indeed exist 
within firms. For example, many large firms have divisions that act as cost centres. There are 
often internal negotiations and transfers of resources between divisions of modern firms, 
using price indicators for internal accounting. These divisions may have their own accounts 
and profit targets. But are there ‘internal markets’ within firms? A key test is whether or not 
these divisions have separate legal status and are recognized as ‘legal persons’. Internal 
transfers within the firm do not involve the exchange of legal property rights. The objects of 
‘exchange’ remain the property of the firm. These ‘exchanges’ are not legally enforceable 
contracts of trade: they are internal transfers. If a division of the firm is delegated the power to 
enter into contracts with outside bodies, then the firm as a whole is legally the party to the 
contract. The division is merely exercising delegated powers; it acts ‘in the name’ of the 
corporation, and the corporation as a whole is legally responsible for its liabilities under the 
agreed contract. Because the firm is a singular legal entity, legal trading within a firm is 
limited at best to such factors as the renegotiation of employment contracts, and does not 
apply to inter-divisional transfers. 
Of course, there are cases where multiple firms are controlled by the same group of 
directors, or owned by the same parent company. This leads to cases where multiple firms 
begin to look and act like a single firm. In particular, multinational enterprises will exist as 
separate legal bodies in different countries, all owned by the headquarters corporation. To 
cope with these complications we need several terms, not one: such as ‘firm’, ‘conglomerate’ 
and ‘multinational conglomerate’. It is important not to confuse these, as they refer to 
different structures and have different economic consequences. 
The importance of real property rights, real contract enforceability, and real power to 
determine prices, was emphasized by Hayek (1944, 1948) and others in their powerful 
critique of the central planning scheme of Oskar Lange and Frederick Taylor (1938). The 
Lange-Taylor scheme involved an attempt to replicate aspects of the market, rather than the 
establishment of the market proper, despite its popular title of ‘market socialism’. In this 
scheme the local managers would not have the power to make contracts and set prices 
themselves. This contrasts greatly with the powers of traders within genuine markets. 
While Hayek identified some of the vital aspects of a market system, including the 
discretionary ability to make contracts along with their potential benefits and liabilities, these 
very criteria establish that the firm is not itself a market. If it is further argued that the market 
is the only appropriate system to deal with allocation and innovation, then one is left 
wondering how the firm as an organization – and particularly the large modern corporation – 
can be justified within the Hayekian scheme. Hayek and other Austrians rightly point to the 
role of the entrepreneur in a context of uncertainty, but gives relatively little consideration to 
the organizational instruments that entrepreneurs may use or create to bring their innovative 
dreams to life. The emphasis is on the entrepreneur and the market, neglecting the relationship 
between the entrepreneur and the organization.  
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The persuasive argument that the large firm is not a fully centralized system of planning 
either (Langlois, 1995), makes no difference here. Neither were Soviet-style command 
economies fully centralized; much ‘planning’ simply consisted of doing again what had been 
done before (Nove, 1979). The key point is that the Hayekian argument establishes that the 
firm is not a market, but fails to explain why firms actually exist. In pushing the ideal of the 
market to the extreme, little justification is offered for the existence of the firm. As a whole, 
Hayekian economics has little to say about the nature and internal organization of the firm.4 
The explanation of the existence of the firm is a complex and still controversial matter that 
cannot be discussed adequately here. If we accept the widespread view that transaction costs 
are at least part of the story (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), then this explanation relies on 
problems of uncertainty and information in the formulation, monitoring and enforcement of 
contracts (Dahlman, 1979). 
In any case, the very existence of the firm, as a non-market mode of economic activity and 
allocation, challenges the neoliberal tenet that the market is always best. If this neoliberal 
proposition were true, then we would have no grounds to support the existence of the modern 
corporation. Neoliberalism extols individualism and the market, and demands that the powers 
of state administration should be minimized, but it is strangely silent about key questions 
concerning the other bureaucratic monsters in our midst: the modern corporations, within 
which administration and bureaucratic authority replace individual contract and market 
exchange. The following section examines an aspect of such non-market authority within the 
typical modern corporation. 
3. The Employment Contract 
Not all firms involve employment contracts: partnerships or cooperatives (without employees) 
can be exceptions. Nevertheless, most workers in most modern firms are employees, paid a 
wage or a salary for work according to a contract of employment. An employment contract 
differs from other contracts in important respects. This, as shown below, creates difficulties 
for the neoliberal vision. 
A key difference between an employment contract and a contract for services is that in the 
employment contract the detailed pattern of work is unspecified. Instead, the employment 
contract specifies the general area of work, and invests the employer with the authority to 
direct the employee to particular activities when required (Simon, 1951). The employer has 
the power of control over the pattern and manner of work, within certain boundaries 
determined by stipulation, law or custom. Employment contracts are asymmetrical, in that 
powers of discretionary authority and interference are invested in one party rather than the 
other. This extensive ‘right of control or interference’ by an employer distinguishes the 
employment relation from a contract for services. If we enter into a contract for services with 
an individual, then we have no power of detailed control over the manner and pattern of work. 
The individual, self-employed contractor has much more detailed control than the employee 
over her work. Making this distinction in practice between employment and a contract for 
                                                 
4 However, I do not wish to deny the important contributions of some authors that, while strongly influenced by 
Hayek, also draw heavily from other intellectual traditions, such as Langlois (1992) and Loasby (1998). It is 
certainly possible to synthesise Hayek’s ideas with other approaches and gain important insights about the 
existence and internal organization of the firm. 
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services is sometimes difficult, with messy boundary cases tested in law. But it is no less real 
or important for that (Deakin and Morris, 1995; Kahn-Freund, 1983; Wedderburn, 1971, 
1993).  
The very existence of the employment contract is due to problems of knowledge. If the 
nature of the required work was known for sure in advance, then there would be need for 
neither an employment contract nor employer authority, and a straightforward contract for 
services would be adequate. The employment contract enables the employer to deal with 
unforeseen circumstances and call upon the workers to change their activities in ways that 
cannot be anticipated at the outset.5 
Neoliberalism is largely silent about this dilemma, because it assumes that well-specified 
individual contracts are generally the best allocative mechanism. Some neoliberals argue that 
there is no substantial difference between an employment contract and everyday contracts for 
services or goods (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Neoliberalism is typically silent about the 
nature of asymmetrical authority inside the firm (Ciepley, 2004). Yet the question remains: 
why aren’t employment contract eroded away by the rising tide of market freedom, to be 
replaced by contracts for services between entrepreneurs and self-employed producers and 
consultants? In a free market society, what basis or legitimation remains for a contract in 
which rights of control and interference are placed in the hands of one party but not the other 
(Ellerman, 1992)? 
Although the employment contract has its origins in the norms of feudal service and the law 
of ‘master and servant’ (Batt, 1929; Deakin, 2001) this explains neither its remarkable 
persistence nor its global growth, to the point where it has eroded and replaced much self-
employment among peasants and artisans throughout the developed and developing world. 
The answer to this conundrum is that the employment relationship is the most useful, salient 
and historically tested mechanism for dealing with problems of complexity and uncertainty in 
the production process: it offers some flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies and 
changing perceptions of evolving complex phenomena. 
Production processes depend upon dispersed, uncodifiable and tacit knowledge. They are 
generally complex to the degree that precise analysis and prediction are often confounded. 
The complexity and inaccessibility of much of this knowledge means that no worker or 
manager can know fully what is going on. For these reasons, employment contracts are 
imperfectly and incompletely specified. The terms of the contract cannot in practice be spelt 
out in full detail because of the complexity of the work process, and the degree of 
unpredictability of key outcomes. These problems of complexity and uncertainty are found to 
some degree in other contracts, but with employment contracts they are particularly severe. 
Emile Durkheim (1984, p. 158) proposed in 1893 that ‘in a contract not everything is 
contractual’: there are factors, not reducible to the intentions or agreements of individuals, 
which have regulatory and binding functions for the contract itself. These consist of rules and 
norms that are not necessarily codified in law. The parties to the agreement have no 
alternative but to rely on institutional rules and standard patterns of behaviour, which cannot 
for practical reasons be established or confirmed by detailed negotiation. Significantly, such 
problems exist to a relatively high degree within employment contracts. Because of the more 
                                                 
5 While Marx (1867, chs. 6-7) clearly recognised the asymmetric relations of authority in the firm, and this 
crucial difference between a sales contract and an employment contract, he has no adequate explanation of why 
employment contracts exist. 
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extensive and intense social interactions involved, they rely even more on (explicit and 
inexplicit) social conventions and norms, and even more on the cultural cement of loyalty and 
trust (Fox, 1974). In this case the practical limits to contractual specification are especially 
severe, and uncodifiable intangibles such as duty and precedent must fill in the gaps. 
Among others, Joseph Schumpeter (1942), Karl Polanyi (1944) have noted that relations of 
employment cannot be completely reduced to explicit contracts. Schumpeter, for example, 
stressed that capitalism depended upon norms of loyalty and trust inherited from the former 
feudal era. Employment contracts are thus only partially successful attempts to encapsulate a 
messy and complex situation in contractarian terms. The difficulties outlined by Schumpeter, 
Polanyi and others cast severe doubt on the possibility of a purified capitalism operating 
through individual self-interest and explicit contract alone. All contracts, and especially the 
employment relationship, depend on factors additional to informed mutual consent. 
Neoliberalism relies on the notions of defined property rights and informed consent. Within 
the employment relationship, the standard contractarian model of symmetrical and informed 
consent is modified by the existence of asymmetrical authority. Furthermore, employment 
contracts owe their existence to problems of uncertainty and unknowledge; neoliberalism is 
generally challenged by ubiquitous problems limiting the commodification of information and 
knowledge. 
Unlike other commodities, the contractual transfer of information has some curious 
features that challenge and possibly impair the standard contractarian framework. Some of 
these oddities were pointed out several years ago by Richard Nelson (1959, p. 306) and 
developed by Kenneth Arrow (1962) in a famous article. Implicitly, Arrow confined his 
discussion to explicit and transferable information, and excluded tacit knowledge. First, once 
acquired, codifiable information can often be easily reproduced in multiple copies by its 
buyer, and possibly be sold to others. This places the seller at a disadvantage. Accordingly, 
there may be licences, patents or other restrictions to prevent the buyer from selling it on to 
others. Second, information has the peculiar property that, once it is sold, it also remains in 
the hands of the seller. Information is not a ‘normal’ commodity that changes hands from 
seller to buyer when it is purchased. Thomas Jefferson allegedly likened knowledge to the 
light of a candle: even as its flame is passed on to another candle, its own light is not 
weakened. Third, and crucially for our purposes here, Arrow (1962, p. 616) wrote: ‘there is a 
fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for information: its value for the 
purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it 
without cost’. If we knew what we were going to buy then we would no longer need to buy it. 
As a result, in an economy involving substantial flows of information, it is not always 
possible, to use Hayek’s (1948, p. 18) possessive phraseology, to establish clear ‘rules which, 
above all, enable man to distinguish between mine and thine’. As Arrow suggested, 
information challenges the bounds of exclusive and individual property. For instance, what is 
sold as information remains also the property of the seller. Outside the restrictions of patent 
laws, what is possessed cannot always be clearly defined, because to define it openly is to 
give it away. It is often unclear as to who owns what information. It is not always possibly to 
break up information into discrete pieces and give each one an ownership tag. It is often 
difficult to determine who ‘discovered’ the information in the first place, and who can thus 
claim legal title to its ‘ownership’. Far from being transparent, in an information-rich society 
what is ‘mine’ and what is ‘thine’ may become increasingly mysterious. 
In particular, the crucial problem of not knowing what we are buying until after we have 
bought it is clearly manifest in many modern employment contracts. This is especially the 
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case with highly specialized and skilled employees, where the hirers do not share the same 
skill and thus cannot know what they have hired, and will thus be unable to make a fully-
informed judgment of employee competences. Even if the interviewing panel did have these 
skills, it would be extremely unlikely that the higher managers appointing the members of the 
panel would have them as well. Who judges the judgment of the judges? This information 
problem was explored by Frank Knight (1921) in his classic work on the firm. He identified 
the intractable problem of ‘judgment of judgment’ (p. 311) in a climate of unknowledge and 
uncertainty. How do we judge the capabilities of others to make good decisions, in regard to 
matters with which we are ourselves unfamiliar? In other words, the purchase or allocation of 
knowledge or competence itself requires knowledge or competence, and there is a potential 
problem of infinite regress (Pelikan, 1989). At the minimum, this undermines Freidman’s 
(1962, p. 13) requirement of full information for a mutually beneficial transaction. At the 
maximum, the development of finite number of markets for skilled labour requires some skills 
of judgment that are not themselves hired on markets. 
Typically it will be assumed that the potential employee will learn many of the particular 
skills after he or she is appointed. Such learning will often depend on imitation and close 
interaction with others at work. But it is impossible to specify fully in advance the skills that a 
worker may acquire while working on the job, or to detail the information that may be 
transferred and the learning experiences that may occur. 
Difficulties of this kind do not arise simply at the selection and appointment of an 
employee. They remain during the subsequent period of employment. By definition, 
employment involves potential control and supervision by others. However, as Drucker 
(1993, p. 107) asserts, the modern ‘organization is increasingly composed of specialists, each 
of whom knows more about his or her own speciality than anybody else in the organization.’ 
This creates a supervisory problem. If the worker has the highly specific and idiosyncratic 
skills that are needed in a complex economy, then the extent of proficient supervision and 
control of the worker depends also on the possession of relevant capabilities by the 
supervisor. In an increasing number of cases, these capabilities will be lacking. Close and 
highly evaluative supervision, based on a hierarchy of command, will be less viable, simply 
because the nominal supervisors will not know the best way of doing the job – or even the 
precise purpose of the specialist job itself – and the worker will know better. 
The shift from physical to intellectual work also compounds the problem. Even though 
managers lacked complete knowledge of the idiosyncratic skills required in action-centered 
work, at least they could observe the physical activity and its output, and make semi-informed 
judgments concerning the efficiency and aptitude of the worker. In contrast, with intellective 
skills, meaningful supervision is less viable. We can observe manual work, but it is 
impossible to see what is going on in someone’s head (Zuboff, 1988). 
Admittedly, developments in information technology would in some respects make 
sophisticated surveillance of the workforce possible. However, such surveillance would 
mainly concern the location and visible engagement of the workers, not the internal workings 
of the mind, nor the evaluation of the details of knowledge-intensive work. Just as managers 
cannot know much of what their workers know, neither can a video- or computer-based 
monitoring system. 
To some degree, problems associated with a degree of complexity existed in early 
industrial capitalism, even when manual workers were operating looms, digging ditches or 
sharpening pins. Workers have always possessed some tacit and other skills beyond the reach 
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of managerial comprehension. But in modern, complex, knowledge-intensive capitalism the 
predicament has become immensely more compounded and severe. 
4. Socially Embedded Knowledge 
The relative importance of the physical means of production in the production process, 
compared with knowledge and other ‘intangible assets,’ has typically been over-stressed by 
mainstream and non-mainstream economists alike. Mainstream economists have long 
depicted the contribution of physical ‘capital’, alongside ‘labour’, to production, treating them 
both as inputs into a mechanistic function. Heterodox economists from Karl Marx to Piero 
Sraffa have also stressed tangible rather than intangible assets.6 
Against this overwhelming trend, Thorstein Veblen was one of the first to stress the 
relative importance of immaterial assets, including the ‘knowledge and practice of ways and 
means’ (Veblen, 1919, p. 343). For Veblen (1919, pp. 185-6) production relied on ‘the 
accumulated, habitual knowledge of the ways and means involved ... the outcome of long 
experience and experimentation’. The production and use of all material and immaterial assets 
depends on elusive, immaterial circumstances and combinations of skills, which are often 
difficult to identify and own. These capacities depend on the institutions and culture of the 
socio-economic system, and are built up over a long period of time. Accordingly, ‘the 
capitalist employer is ... not possessed of any appreciable fraction of the immaterial 
equipment’ that is drawn upon every day in the process of production (Veblen, 1919, p. 344).7 
In contrast, mainstream explanations of economic growth have stressed changes in factor 
inputs, on the one hand, and technological changes driven by research and development, on 
the other. Emphasis on such tangible inputs and measures has obscured the importance of the 
accumulation of knowledge. Again this trend, Kenneth Boulding (1966, p. 6) pointed out that 
economic development is essentially a knowledge process, ‘but we are still too much 
obsessed by mechanical models, capital-income ratios, and even input-output tables, to the 
neglect of the study of the learning process which is the real key to development.’ 
There is still a tendency to treat knowledge and skills as discrete and separable substances, 
stored up and possessed by individuals, alongside and akin to their material wealth. For 
example, the widespread use of the term ‘human capital’ often misleads us by suggesting that 
accumulated knowledge and skills are substances which are readily measurable in monetary 
terms and generally tradable on the market. By contrast, knowledge is relational and 
contextual, in that its meaning depends upon interpretative frameworks and circumstances 
(Langlois, 2001; Nooteboom, 2000). A social or local culture provides interpretations and 
meanings, and all knowledge is dependent on this context. Social institutions are structures 
that preserve and reproduce these cultural conventions. We rely on these institutions, and 
interaction with others, to acquire the cognitive capacity to make sense of the chaotic 
                                                 
6 Heterodox economists, especially Marx, have also emphasised the social character of productive activity. Marx 
had less to say, however, about the role of intangible assets and the nature of knowledge. It was Veblen who 
brought these things to the fore. 
7 The concept of intangible assets was taken up and developed by John R. Commons (1924, pp. 235-82; 1934, 
pp. 649-72). 
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multitude of data that reach our senses. We rely on the social institution of language in order 
to receive and communicate information (Hodgson, 1988). 
Neoliberalism proposes that people have a stronger incentive to improve their condition 
when through ownership of property they reap the rewards of their efforts. They propose ‘a 
regime that allows the acquisition of property’ wherein the individual ‘on his own account’ 
may ‘better his condition … quite independently of any complementing collective action, 
beyond that required for the necessary functioning of the legal order’ (Buchanan, 1993, p. 51). 
Here the role of ‘collective action’ is limited to establishing and sustaining the legal 
framework. This ignores the social dimension of knowledge, and the dependence of the 
individual on others to reach any understanding about the world. Our reliance on these 
additional social institutions increases with volume of information and degree of complexity 
in the socio-economic sphere. 
For these reasons, knowledge is not completely divisible into separate units, and can never 
be fully commodified. Furthermore, all knowledge depends on the cultural and institutional 
context, which is of a social character and cannot become the object of property of any 
individual or group. As Veblen (1898, pp. 353-4) argued: ‘The isolated individual is not a 
productive agent. ... There can be no production without technical knowledge; hence no 
accumulation and no wealth to be owned, in severalty or otherwise. And there is no technical 
knowledge apart from an industrial community.’ Building on Veblen’s argument, John A. 
Hobson (1936, p. 67) similarly argued that productivity could not be explained wholly in 
terms of the ‘factors’ owned by individual agents: 
The productivity of workers on the soil or in the factory depends for its amount and 
quality not entirely and not chiefly upon their working energy, but upon economic 
conditions under which they work that lie outside their personal control. First and 
foremost among these conditions is the state of the industrial arts, a rich social 
inheritance of long accumulation, which is the basis of all skilled workmanship. No 
living worker or group of workers can properly lay claim to this accumulated 
knowledge as his private possession, though he is entitled to utilize it in order to 
increase his productivity. 
Learning is an instituted process of interpretation, appraisal, trial, feedback, and evaluation, 
involving socially-transmitted cognitive frames and routinized group practices, which are 
often taken for granted. Learning is context dependent, culture-bound and institutionalized.  
These arguments have crucial implications for the neoliberal conception of the 
employment contract. Social and organisational knowledge – the relational interconnection of 
knowledge throughout the system – make it difficult to establish, in terms of intellectual 
property, what is ‘mine and thine’ for much of the tacit and codifiable knowledge in the 
economy. Accordingly, the employment contract is not a straightforward exchange of a wage 
or salary for individual skills and capacities. These skills and capacities depend upon the 
social context, which is owned by no-one but is essential to all productive and technological 
activity. 
Admittedly, part of this cultural and institutional context is specific to the firm in question, 
and thus is part of the intangible assets of that firm. Capabilities do not reside merely in 
individuals because they are partly dependent on the organizational context. The value of 
individual skills depends upon their employment in particular organizational settings. The 
work process entails a process of inquiry, reflection and evaluation in which the model that is 
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shared by several people is adapted and embedded in the regular practices of the 
organization.8 
However, the intangible knowledge assets of the firm are only a small part of the story. 
Similar considerations concerning the role of culture, interpretative frameworks and context 
also apply to the society as a whole. A skilled worker may be able to increase his or her 
productivity and remuneration by a few percentage points by moving from one firm to 
another in a given region. But when a skilled worker moves from (say) Bangladesh to (say) 
the United States, the increase in productivity and remuneration can be much greater. This 
cannot be adequately explained by the differences in corporate culture alone, because 
similarly large increases would often apply to a self-employed skilled worker. The most 
important factor is the difference in the broader and inherited ‘state of the industrial arts’, 
involving a much denser network of knowledge-rich interactions in the more developed 
country. 
Because employment capabilities depend on social as well as organizational contexts, the 
employment contract is not in essence a straightforward ‘exchange’ of atomistic rights and 
contributions between the firm and the worker. Both also depend on the social culture and 
other social institutions, which are not in the possession of any identifiable agent. The social 
character of knowledge and skilled work thus undermines the neoliberal presumption that we 
can readily distinguish between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’. 
Furthermore, as noted above, monitoring and control is made much more difficult by the 
complex and interrelated character of production. In sum, the employment contract is in large 
measure a convenient fiction, couched in the individualistic categories of modern contract 
law, which in fact masks the social and co-operative character of all productive activity. 
Although the employment relationship has been profitably adapted to the modern world of 
complex and uncertain production, the increasing reliance on socially embedded knowledge 
puts a strain on a contractarian formulation based on individual assets. 
Accordingly, neoliberal assumptions are generally ill-suited to the capitalist world of firms 
and employment contracts. Furthermore, insofar as capitalist development involves greater 
use of knowledge and skills, the distance of the modern world from the neoliberal ideal type 
of definable individual contracting of discrete individual property becomes even greater. The 
increasing complexity and knowledge intensity of the production process widens the 
mismatch between productive realities and individualistic formulations of the employment 
contract. As production becomes more interrelated and social in its character, neoliberalism 
becomes increasingly an anachronism (Hodgson, 1999). 
5. Conclusion 
The neoliberal precepts of market individualism arose in the seventeenth century and remain, 
if anything, more suited to that age of production dominated by small-craft and self-employed 
producers, than to the modern world of work controlled by corporations and contracts of 
employment. But neoliberal theory cannot explain the existence of employment relations even 
within Smith’s pin factory, and has become increasingly anachronistic as more and more 
workers have been employed by capitalist firms.  
                                                 
8 See, for example, Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996), Winter (1982), Aoki (1990), Dosi and Marengo (1994), 
Teece and Pisano (1994). 
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Neoliberalism has difficulty distinguishing between a firm and a market, explaining the 
absence of true markets within the firm, and further distinguishing between an employment 
contract and a contract for services. Once these important distinctions are upheld, the 
questions emerge of why firms and employment contracts exist. The answers lie in part in the 
degree of complexity, unknowledge and uncertainty surrounding modern production 
processes. These institutional arrangements have survived in part because of their capacity to 
deal with such an environment. 
Veblen acknowledge the socially embedded nature of productive knowledge, and this idea 
is incorporated in much modern literature in business economics and organization science. It 
has profound consequences for the individualist, possessive and contractarian foundations of 
neoliberalism. Crucially, it is no longer possible to break all knowledge down into pieces and 
give each one an ownership tag. Yet knowledge is a central and increasingly paramount 
resource. This has implications for the proposal that productive resources should become 
tradable objects of possession, and particular implications for the employment contract and 
employee remuneration. 
Most neoliberals acknowledge some legitimate and limited scope for government 
intervention. Hayek (1960) to his credit laid out some of the limits to market allocation and 
prescribed a limited constitutional role for the state. But adequate answers to the conceptual 
problems outlined here relating to firms and employment are absent from his works. In 
particular, the socially embedded nature of knowledge raises questions concerning an 
enlarged role of state in creating and fostering the knowledge base. 
Such issues were posed eloquently in 1841 by Friedrich List (1904) in his critique of British 
classical economics, where he proposed a developmental role for the state, involving the 
promotion of a system of education and training. In their responses to nineteenth century 
market individualists such as Herbert Spencer (1884), Durkheim in 1893 and Hobson in 1902 
identified the limits of individualistic and contractarian arrangements, and the dependence of 
a market economy on social institutions and norms that are not readily sustained through 
market trading alone (Durkheim, 1984; Hobson, 1902).  
These earlier examples show that objections to market individualism are not confined to 
those socialists that would place the market in a marginal role and substitute a substantial 
apparatus for central planning. Indeed, sophisticated criticism of market individualism by 
more nuanced and moderate thinkers such as List, Durkheim and Hobson, has been 
overshadowed in the twentieth century by the great debate between more extreme 
formulations of socialism and capitalism. Ultimately, the viability and dynamic efficiency of 
schemes of comprehensive collective planning have been fatally challenged in theory and 
undermined by the Soviet Bloc experience. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-91 
signalled to many that neoliberalism had won that debate. However, the very growth of 
complexity and global traffic in information – which had placed intolerable burdens on the 
Soviet regime (Bergson, 1978; Haddad, 1995) – has also compromised the neoliberal analysis. 
To a large extent, neoliberalism was the Soviet alter-ego. It is no accident that the terms 
‘socialism’ and ‘individualism’ both emerged in French and English in the 1820-40 period, in 
similar intellectual contexts (Bestor, 1948). For much of two centuries, the one doctrine has 
fed on the other. 
Especially when placed in the context of a modern knowledge-intensive economy, the 
argument here points to a revival, not of the tired old dichotomy between widespread free 
markets and comprehensive planning, but to a middle-ground philosophy that involves 
substantial, limited and complementary roles for both markets and states. In this regard we 
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can learn much from the substantial Anglo-American ‘social democratic’ or ‘social liberal’ 
streams of thought that include T. H. Green, D. G. Ritchie, J. A. Hobson, John Dewey, John 
Maynard Keynes, and John Kenneth Galbraith. Reality fits into neither a Marxian nor a 
neoliberal mould. 
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